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CHAPTER 10 
Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
N uclear, chemical, and biological weapons present special law of armed conflict problems due to their potential for indiscriminate effect. This 
chapter addresses legal considerations pertaining to the development, possession, 
deployment and employment of these weapons. 
10.2 NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
10.2.1 General. There are no rules of customary or conventional international 
law prohibiting nations from employing nuclear weapons in armed conflict.1 In 
1. Singh & McWhinney, Nuclear Weapons and Contemporary IntemationalLaw (1988). In 
1994, the United Nations General Assembly passed U.N.G.A. Res. 49175K (15 Dec. 1994) 
requesting an advisory opinion of the LCJ. on the question: 
Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under 
international law? 
Rejecting the argument of some States, including the United States, that the LCJ. should, in the 
exercise of its discretion, decline to issue an opinion "on what is in many respects a political 
matter," the Court responded to the General Assembly request with an advisory opinion stating 
that: 
A. There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any specific 
authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons (unanimous vote); 
B. There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any 
comprehensive and universal prohibition on the threat or use of nuclear weapons as 
such (11 to 3 vote); 
C. A threat or use offorce by means of nuclear weapons that is conttary to Article 2, 
paragtaph 4 of the United Nations Charter and that fulls to meet all the requirements 
of Article 51, is unlawful (unanimous vote); 
D. A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with requirements 
of the international law applicable in armed conflicts, particularly those of the 
principles and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as with specific 
obligations under treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear 
weapons (unanimous vote); 
E. It follows from the a,bove-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of intemationallaw applicable in 
armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law; 
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the absence of such an express prohibition, the use of nuclear weapons against 
enemy combatants and other military objectives is not unlawful. Employment of 
nuclear weapons is, however, subject to the following principles: the right of the 
parties to the conflict to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited; it is 
prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population as such; and 
distinction must be made at all times between combatants and noncombatants to 
the effect that the latter be spared as much as possible.2 Given their destructive 
1.( ... continued) 
However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements off act 
at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of 
self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake (7 to 7 vote with 
the President's vote breaking the tie); 
F. There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion 
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective 
international control (unanimous vote). 
I.CJ. Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the TIlreat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,July 8, 1996, reprinted in 
35 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 809 (1996). For commentary on the Court's non-binding advisory opinion see 
Matheson, The Opinions of the International Court of Justice and the Use of Nuclear \Veapons. 
91 Am.]. Int'l L. 417 (1997); Schmitt, The International Court ofJustice and the Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, 7 U.S.A.F.A.]. Leg. Studies 57 (1997), revised and scheduled for reprint in Nav. \Var 
Coll. Rev., Spring 1998 at 91-116; McNeill, The International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion 
in the Nuclear Weapons Cases-a First Appraisal, 316 I.C.R.C. Rev. 103 (1997); Bekker. 
International Decisions, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 91 
Am.J. Int'l L. 126 (1997). 
2. In its advisory opinion of the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons (sec note 1). the 
International Court of Justice held (Finding D) that the law of armed conflict governs use of 
nuclear weapons. This was a position advocated by, inter alia, the United States. Sec gCllemlly 
Written Statement of the Government of the United States of America, June 20, 1995 (Legality of 
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons). Accord Green, Nuclear Weapons and the Law of Arnled 
Conflict, 17 Denver]. Int'l L. & Policy 1 (1988); Oeter, Methods and Means of\Varfare, in Fleck, 
at 141-42. For additional background, sec NWIP 10-2, para. 613 & n.8; FM 27-10, para. 35; AFP 
110-31, para. 6-5; AFP 110-34. para. 6-4; ICRC. Commentary (GP I) 593-96. e:f. Reisman, 
Nuclear Weapons in International Law, 4 N.Y.L. Sch.]. Int'l & Compo L. 339, 340 (1983) 
(pointing out the significant difference between what the law now is and what one believes the law 
should be, and recognizing that the effective decisionmakers in the Cold War environment. the 
United States and the U.S.S.R., did not act as if they believed the use of nuclear weapons was per Sf 
illegal). Cold War era constraints on nuclear weapons are described in Bunn. U.S. Law of Nuclear 
Weapons, Nav. War Coll. Rev., July-Aug. 1984, at 46-62. 
The rules relevant to the use of weapons established by GP I apply to conventional weapons only 
and were not intended to have any effect on and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear or 
other weapons of mass destruction. including chemical and biological weapollS. Those questions 
have been the subject of anns control and disarmament negotiations and agreement. Statements 
on ratification by Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands, and by the United Kingdom and the 
United States on signature to GP I; Roach, Certain Conventional Weapons Convention: Anns 
Control or Humanitarian Law? 105 Mil. L. Rev. 1,31-34 n.83 (1984); ICRC. Commentary 
(GP I) 593-94. Sec paragraph 5.4.2, note 34 (p. 303) regarding the U.S. decision not to seek 
ratification of GP 1. 
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potential, the decision to authorize employment of nuclear weapons should 
emanate from the highest level of government. For the United States, that 
authority resides solely in the President. 3 
10.2.2 Treaty Obligations. Nuclear weapons are regulated by a number of 
arms control agreements restricting their development, possession, deployment, 
and use. Some of these agreements (e.g., the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty) may 
not apply during time of war.4 
10.2.2.1 Seabed Anns Control Treaty. This multilateral convention 
prohibits emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed and the ocean floor 
beyond 12 nautical miles from the baseline from which the territorial sea is 
measured.5 The prohibition extends to structures, launching installations, and 
other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing, or using nuclear 
weapons. This treaty prohibits emplacement of nuclear mines on the seabed and 
ocean floor or in the subsoil thereo£ It does not, however, prohibit the use of 
nuclear weapons in the water column, provided they are not affixed to the 
seabed (e.g., nuclear armed depth charges and torpedoes). 
10.2.2.2 Outer Space Treaty. This multilateral convention prohibits the 
placement in earth orbit, installation on the moon and other celestial bodies, and 
stationing in outer space in any other manner, of nuclear and other weapons of 
mass destruction. Suborbital missile systems are not included in this prohibition. 6 
3. Joint Pub. 3-12, Subj: Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, at para. la. For a discussion 
of the U.S. view that nuclear weapons remain important for deterrence, see Slocombe, Remarks, 
;11 National Sec. L. Rept., Vol. 19, No.2, May 1997. 
4. Such treaties permit withdrawal if the supreme interests of a nation are at stake; these 
treaties include the Seabed Anns Control Treaty (art. VIII) (see paragraph 10.2.2.1 and note 5), 
Outer Space Treaty (art. XIV) (see paragraph 10.2.2.2 and note 6), Treaty ofTlatelolco (art. 30.1) 
and its two Protocols (see paragraph 10.2.2.4 and note 8 (p. 462», Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (art. 
IV) (see paragraph 10.2.2.5 and note 9 (p. 463», Non-Proliferation Treaty (art. X.1) (see paragraph 
10.2.2.6 and note 10 (p. 464», and, of the bilateral nuclear arms control agreements, the ABM 
Treaty (art. XV.2), the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (art. V.2), and SALT I (art. VlII.3) (see 
paragraph 10.2.2.7 and notes 14, 15 and 17, respectively (p. 465». 
5. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of 
Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, Washington, 
London & Moscow, 11 February 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. 7337, reprinted ;11 AFP 110-20, at 
4-26 [hereinafter SeabedArrns Control Treaty]. There were 93 parties to the SeabedArrns Control 
Treaty as of24 June 1997. Weapons of mass destruction, other than nuclear weapons, are not defined 
in this or any other arms control treaty. Baselines are described in paragraph 1.3 (p. 3). 
6. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Washington, London & Moscow, 
27 January 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. 6347, reprillted ;11 AFP 110-20, at 6-30 [hereinafter 
Outer Space Treaty]. There were 98 parties to the Outer Space Treaty asof24 June 1997. This 
(continued ... ) 
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10.2.2.3 Antarctic Treaty. The Antarctic Treaty is a multilateral convention 
designed to ensure that Antarctica, defined to include the area south of 60° South 
Latitude, is used for peaceful purposes only. The treaty prohibits in Antarctica 
"any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and 
fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any 
type of weapons." Nuclear explosions are specifically prohibited. Ships and 
aircraft at points of discharging or embarking personnel or cargoes in Antarctica 
are subject to international inspection. Ships operating on and under, and aircraft 
operating over the high seas within the treaty area are not subject to these 
prohibitions.7 
10.2.2.4 Treaty ofTlatelolco. This treaty is an agreement among the Latin 
American countries not to introduce nuclear weapons into Latin America. The 
treaty does not, however, prohibit Latin American nations from authorizing 
nuclear-armed ships and aircraft of non-member nations to visit their ports and 
airfields or to transit through their territorial sea or airspace.8 The treaty is not 
applicable to the means of propulsion of any vessel. 
Protocol I to the treaty is an agreement among non-Latin American nations 
that exercise international responsibility over territory within the treaty area to 
abide by the denuclearization provisions of the treaty. France, the Netherlands, 
the U.K., and the U.S. are parties to Protocol 1. For purposes of this treaty, U.S. 
controlled territory in Latin America includes Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, the 
Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. Consequently the U.S. cannot maintain 
nuclear weapons in those areas. Protocol I nations retain, however, competence 
to authorize transits and port visits by ships and aircraft of their own or other 
armed forces in their Protocol I territories, irrespective of armament, cargo, or 
means of propulsion. 
6.( ... continued} 
treaty also limits the use of the moon and other celestial bodies exclusively to peaceful purposes and 
expressly prohibits their use for establishing military bases, installations, or fortifications, testing 
weapons of any kind, or conducting military maneuvers. See also paragraphs 2.9.1 and 2.9.2 
(p. 149). 
7. Antarctic Treaty, Washington, 1 December 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. 4780, 402 
U.N.T.S. 71, reprinted inAFP 110-20, at 4-21. There were 43 parties to the Antarctic Treaty on 16 
July 1997 of which 26 are consultative members under article IX of the treaty. See paragraph 
2.4.5.2 (p. 135) for information on peacetime operations in the Antarctic region. 
8. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) , 
Mexico City, 14 February 1967, 634 U.N.T.S.281,22 U.S.T. 762, T.I.A.S. 7137, reprinted in AFP 
110-20, at 4-9. The travaux prq,aratoires and navigational implications of this treaty and its two 
protocols are fully discussed in paragraph 2.4.6, notes 80 and 81 (p. 136). The United States is also a 
signatory of, but not yet a party to, Protocols I, II and III of the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free 
Zone Treaty, and Protocols I and II of the 1996 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. See 
paragraph 2.4.6, note 82 (p. 137). 
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Protocol II is an agreement among nuclear-armed nations (China, France, 
Russia, the U.K., and the U.S.) to respect the denuclearization aims of the treaty, 
to not use nuclear weapons against Latin American nations party to the treaty, and 
to refrain from contributing to a violation of the treaty by Latin American nations. 
10.2.2.5 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This multilateral treaty prohibits the 
testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space, and 
underwater.9 Over 100 nations are party to the treaty, including Russia, the 
9. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under 
Water, Moscow, 5 August 1963,14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43, reprinted inAFP 
110-20, at 4-3 [hereinafter Nuclear Test Ban Treaty]. There were 116 parties as of24 June 1997. 
The treaty also prohibits "any other nuclear explosion" in the specified areas: 
The phrase "any other nuclear explosion" includes explosions for peaceful purposes. 
Such explosions are prohibited by the treaty because of the difficulty of 
differentiating between weapon test explosions and peaceful explosions without 
additional controls. 
Statement of State Department Legal Adviser to Senate Foreign Relations Comm., reprinted in 11 
Whiteman 793-96. 
All bodies of water, including inland waters, are included within the term "under water" (id. at 
790). The treaty also prohibits nuclear explosions in any other environment if the explosion would 
cause radioactive debris to be present outside the borders of the nation conducting the explosion. 
Underground tests which do not cause radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits 
of the nation in which the test is conducted are not prohibited (id. at 791). 
The treaty does not impose any limitation on the use of nuclear weapons by the parties in armed 
conflict (id. at 793-98). 
On 12 December 1995, the U.N. General Assembly resumed its call for a comprehensive nuclear 
test ban treaty that would embrace all nuclear explosive testing, including underground testing. 
U.N.G.A. Res. 50/65, Dec. 1995. On 17 September 1996, the U.N. General Assembly adopted 
U.N.G.A. Res. 501245, Sep. 1997 and the text of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 
U.N. Doc. M/50/1027, reprinted in 35 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 1439 (1996). The basic obligation of States 
in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is contained in art. I: 
1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear test explosion or any 
other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at 
any place under its jurisdiction or control. 
2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, 
or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion 
or any other nuclear explosion. 
The Treaty also establishes an international organization to ensure compliance with its terms, 
particularly the comprehensive verification procedures which it mandates. The United States and 
146 other nations are signatories to the Treaty which is not yet in force. Among the nations that are 
not signatories are India, Iraq, North Korea and Pakistan. On 22 September 1997, President 
Clinton submitted the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to the Senate for its advice and 
consent to ratification. 
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U.K., and the U.s. (France and China are not parties.) Underground testing of 
nuclear weapons is not included within the ban. 
10.2.2.6 Non-Proliferation Treaty. This multilateral treaty obligates 
nuclear-weapons-nations to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons or 
nuclear weapons technology to non-nuclear-weapons-nations, and obligates 
non-nuclear-weapons-nations to refrain from accepting such weapons from 
nuclear-weapons-nations or from manufacturing nuclear weapons themselves. 
The treaty does not apply in time of war.10 
10.2.2.7 Bilateral Nuclear Arms Control Agreements. The United States 
and Russia (as the successor state to the U.S.S.R.) are parties to a number of 
bilateral agreements designed to either restrain the growth or reduce the number 
of nuclear warheads and launchers and to reduce the risk of miscalculation that 
could trigger a nuclear exchange. Among these agreements are the Hotline 
10. Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Washington, London & Moscow 1 
July 1968,21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, reprinted inAFP 110-20, at 4-5. This 
treaty is designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons; to provide assurances, through 
international safeguards that the peaceful nuclear activities of nations which have not already 
developed nuclear weapons will not be diverted to making such weapons; to promote, to the 
maximum extent consistent with the other purposes of the treaty, the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy through full cooperation, with the potential benefits of any peaceful application of nuclear 
explosive technology being made available to non-nuclear parties under appropriate international 
observation; and to express the determination of the parties that the treaty should lead to further 
progress in comprehensive arms control and nuclear disarmament measures. 
There were 187 nations party to this treaty as of 27 June 1997, including the 
nuclear-weapons-nations of China, France, Russia, the U.K. and the U.S. Only Brazil, Cuba, 
Israel, India and Pakistan are non-parties; the latter three of whom either have nuclear weapons or 
the technology to manufacture them. N.Y. Times, 4 May 1987, at A24. On 3 December 1993, 
North Korea became the first and only nation to withdraw from the Treaty. Arms Control 
Reporter, June 1997, at 602.A.l1. 
By its terms, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was to remain in force at least until its 25th 
anniversary, at which time "a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall 
continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods." Art. 
X2. That conference, entided the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension 
Conference, convened in New York and on 11 May 1995 formally extended the Treaty 
"indefinitely". The 1995 Conference also agreed to a set of "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear 
Nonproliferation and Disarmament." Arms Control Reporter, 1996 Annual Report, at chap. 
VI A. For a discussion of the Treaty and calls for its indefinite extension see Epstein & Szasz, 
Extention of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: A Means of Strengthening the Treaty, 33 
Va. J. Int'l L. 735 (1993). For a discussion of forceful counter-proliferation should 
non-proliferation prove ineffective, see Gibson, The International Legal Ramifications of United 
States Counter-Proliferation Strategy: Problems and Prospects, Newport Paper No. 11, U.S. Nav. 
War Coll. (1997). 
Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons 465 
Agreements of 1963 and 1971,11 the Accidents Measures Agreement of 1971,12 
the 1973 Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War,13 the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty of 1972 and its Protocol of 1974,14 the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 
1974,15 the 1976 Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions,16 the SALT 
Agreements of1972 and 1977 (SALT I-Interim Agreement has expired; SALT 
II was never ratified),17 the INF Treaty of 1988,18 and the START treaties of 
11. Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link, with 
Annex, Geneva, 20 June 1963, 14 U.S.T. 825, T.I.A.S. 5362, 472 U.N.T.S. 163; Agreement 
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Measures to 
Improve the USA-USSR Direct Communications Link, with Annex, Washington, 30 September 
1971,22 U.S.T. 1598, T.I.A.S. 7187, 806 U.N.T.S. 402; id. as amended 20 March and 29 April 
1975, 26 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. 8059. (In a note dated 13 January 1992, the Russian Federation 
informed the United States that it u ••• continues to perform the rights and fulfill the obligations 
following from the international agreements signed by the Union of the Soviet Socialist 
Republics ... " T.I.F .• 1 Jan. 1994, at 258.) 
12. Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the 
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist RepubliCs. Washington, 30 September 
1971,22 U.S.T. 1590, T.I.A.S. 7186,807 U.N.T.S. 57. On 15 September 1987, the Agreement 
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, and its two Protocols, were signed in 
Washington and entered into force. Dep't St. Bull., Nov. 1987, at 34; reprinted in 27 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 
76 (1988). 
13. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War, Washington, 22 June 1973, 24 U.S.T. 1478, 
T.I.A.S. 7654. 
14. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, Moscow, 26 May 1972, 12 U.S.T. 2435, 
T.I.A.S. 7503 [hereinafter ABM Treaty]; Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Systems. Moscow, 3 July 1974, entered into force 24 May 1976, 27 U.S.T. 1645, T.I.A.S. 8276. 
See also paragraph 2.9.3.1, note 131 (p. 153). 
15. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, Moscow, 3 July 1974. The Treaty, and 
the 1990 Protocol thereto, entered into force on 11 December 1990. 
16. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, Washington, 28 May 1976, Sen. Ex. 
N. 94th Cong., 2d Sess.; Sen. Ex. Rep. 100-1. The Treaty, and the 1990 Protocol thereto, entered 
into force on 11 December 1990. 
17. SALT I includes the ABM Treaty (see note 14 (p. 465)) and the Interim Agreement 
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain 
Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms with associated Protocol, 
entered into force 3 October 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3462, T.I.A.S. 7504, AFP 110-20 at 4-35. The 
Interim Agreement expired on 3 October 1977. However, both the United States and the Soviet 
Union issued parallel statements announcing that they would continue to observe the limitations 
on strategic buildups which were contained in the agreement. 77 Dep't St. Bull. 642 (1977). 
SALT II is formally known as the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed 18 June 1979, 
submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent 22 June 1979, and withdrawn from the Senate's 
(continued ... ) 
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1991 (START I) and 1993 (START II). The START treaties have initiated the 
process of physical destruction of strategic nuclear warheads and launchers by the 
U.S., Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan (the latter four being recognized 
as successor states to the U.S.S.R. for this purpose) .19 
10.3 CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
Intemationallaw prohibits the use of chemical weapons in armed conflict.20 
10.3.1 Treaty Obligations. The 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol for the Prohibition of 
the use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological 
17.( ... continued) 
calendar in January 1980 at the request of President Carter. In 1977, the Presidents of both 
countries stated they would do nothing to jeopardize the treaty so long as each abided by it. 77 
Dep't St. Bull. 642 (1977). 
In 1982, the United States announced that it would not undercut the expired SALT I Interim 
Agreement and the unratified SALT II Agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal 
restraint. 1 Public Papers of President Reagan 709 (31 May 1982); ACDA, Documents on 
Disarmament, 1982, at 332. However, the United States announced in May 1986 that it would 
henceforth base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the 
threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on the standards contained in the expired SALT I 
Interim Agreement and the unratified SALT II Treaty. Dep't St. Bull., Aug. 1986, at 36-43. 
Consistent with this policy, the United States ceased technical observance of the SALT II Treaty 
on 28 November 1986. 
18. The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF 
Treaty), and associated documents, Washington, 8 December 1987, reprinted in 27 Int'l Leg. Mat'is 
84 (1988), entered into force 1 June 1988. 
19. See Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, 31 July 1991 (START I), 
and accompanying Protocol between the United States and the Republic ofBelarus, the Republic 
of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, 23 May 1992, S. Treaty Doc. 20, 102d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); reprinted in Dept. of State DISPATCH, Oct. 1991, Vol. 2, Supp. No.5. 
The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, 3 January 1993 (START II), to which the 
Senate provided its advice and consent on 26 January 1996. However, the Russian Duma has not. 
Accordingly, START II is not in force. For a discussion of START I and START II see 
Bunn & Rhinelander, The Arms Control Obligations of the Former Soviet Union, 33 Va.]. Int'l 
L. 323 (1993). 
In November 1991 Congress authorized establishment of the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Program, 22 U.S.C. 5952. Sometimes referred to as the Nunn-Lugar Program, this legislation is 
design to assist the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union in the safety, security and 
dismandement of nuclear, chemical and other weapons (to include strategic nuclear delivery 
vehicles). Through FY 1996, approximately $1.5 billion was authorized by Congress to fund this 
effort. See Arms Control Rept., 1996 Annual Report at chap. 6. 
20. Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat, in Fleck at 147-50; Levie, Nuclear, Chemical and 
Biological Weapons, in Robertson at 334-41. 
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Methods of Warfare ("the 1925 Gas Protocol,,)21 is the principal international 
agreement in force relating to the regulation of chemical weapons in armed conflict. 
The fur more comprehensive 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their 
Destruction (the "1993 Chemical Weapons Convention,,)22 will enter into force 
fcth · ··th fu 23 or ose nattons party to It ill e near ture. 
10.3.1.1 The 1925 Gas Protocol. The United States is a party to the 1925 Gas 
Protocol, as are all other NATO nations and all former Warsaw Pact nations. 
The United States, the U.S.S.R., and most other NATO and Warsaw Pact 
nations conditioned their adherence to the 1925 Gas Protocol on the 
understanding that the prohibition against use of chemical weapons
24 
ceases to 
be binding with respect to nations whose armed forces, or the armed forces of 
their allies, fail to respect that prohibition. This, in effect, restricted the 
prohibition to the "first use" of such munitions, with parties to the Protocol 
reserving the right to employ chemical weapons for retaliatory purposes.25 
21. Geneva, 17 June 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, T.l.A.S. 8061, L.N.T.S. 65, reprinted in AFP 
110-20, at 4-68 and in 14 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 49 (1975), entered into force for the United States on 
10 April 1975. There were 145 parties to the 1925 Gas Protocol as ofl September 1997. The 
Protocol is discussed at paragraph 10.3.1.1 (p. 467). 
22. Paris, 13 January 1993, reproduced in 32 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 800 (1993). The 1993 Chemical 
Weapons Convention is discussed in paragraph 10.3.1.2 (p. 472). 
23. The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention actually came into force on 29 April 1997. As 
of29 October 1997,102 nations had ratified or acceded to the Convention. 
24. The operative provisions of the Protocol obligate the contracting nations not to use in war 
"asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and ... all analogous liquids, materials or devices." See the 
Final Declaration of the Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 11 January 
1989, U.N. Doc. Al44/88, 20Jan. 1989, Annex, reprinted in 28 Int'ILeg. Mat'Is 1020 and in Arms 
Control Rep. 704.B.338.2 (1989) and discussed in Recent Developments: Arms Control; 
Declaration of the Paris Chemical Weapons Conference, 30 Harv. Int'l L. J. 495 (1989). For a 
discussion of the 1925 Gas Protocol see Levie, paragraph 10.3, note 20 (p. 466); Oeter, id. at 147-50. 
25. Forty-nine nations adhering to the Protocol have done so subject to reservations. For all 
practical purposes the reservations, although sometimes differendy worded, may all be assimilated 
to the following: 
(1) The Protocol is binding only as regard nations which are parties to the Protocol 
itself (this reservation is somewhat superfluous, as it reiterates something which is 
already stated in the Protocol's text). 
(2) The Protocol ceases to be binding as regards nations whose armed forces, or the 
armed forces of whose allies, fail to respect the prohibition laid down in the ProtocoL 
This formulation of the reservation, which restricts the prohibition to first use of chemical 
weapons, was entered by the following NATOlWarsaw Pact nations: Belgium, Canada, France, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, United States, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Romania and U.S.S.R., and was not objected to by any nation. 
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The 1925 Gas Protocol does not prohibit the development, production, 
testing, or stockpiling of chemical weapons, nor does it prevent equipping and 
training military forces for chemical warfare.26 The United States considers the 
Protocol to be applicable to lethal and incapacitating agents but not to riot 
control agents (see paragraph 10.3.2) or herbicidal agents (see paragraph 10.3.3). 
The United States considers the prohibition against first use of lethal and 
incapacitating chemical weapons to be part of customary international law and, 
therefore, binding on all nations whether or not they are parties to the 1925 Gas 
Protocol. 27 Lethal chemical agents are those asphyxiating, poisonous, or other 
25.( ... continued) 
The United States ratified the 1925 Gas Protocolsubjectto the reservation that it would cease to be 
binding with respect to the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all 
analogous liquids, materials, or devices, in regard to an enemy nation if such nation or any of its 
allies fails to respect the prohibitions in the agreement. 
26. The Federal Republic of Germany was the only nation which, upon ratification of the 
Protocol, unilaterally obligated itself not to produce chemical weapons on its territory. 
The United States has long been committed (e.g., by Art. IX of the 1972 Biological Weapons 
Convention) to the objective of the complete, effective and verifiable prohibition of all chemical 
weapons. 
In 1980, discussions on the multilateral elaboration of a chemical weapons convention were begun 
in the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, Switzerland. On 18 April 1984, 
the United States tabled a comprehensive draft treaty banning entirely the possession, production, 
acquisition, retention or transfer of chemical weapons. Dep't St. Bull.,June 1984, 40-43. The CD 
Draft Convention text of 27 April 1987 may be found in Arms Control Reporter 1987, at 
704.D.I05-118. That draft became the basis of negotiations which produced the 1993 Chemical 
Weapons Convention. 
27. Statement by the President, Use of Poison Gas, 8 June 1943, 8 Dep't St. Bull. 507 (1943) 
(use of chemical weapons has been "oudawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind"); 
Letter from Ass't Sec'y State Macomber to Congo Rosenthal, 22 Dec. 1967, quoted in Bunn, 
Banning Poison Gas and Germ Warfare: Should the United States Agree? 1969 Wis. L. Rev. 375, 
384-85 (the rule set forth in the 1925 Gas Protocol "is now considered to form a part of customary 
international law"); DA Pam. 27-161-2, at 44 (1962). Accord McDougal & Feliciano 634 and 
sources cited therein atn.360; Parks, Classification of Chemical-Biological Warfare, 13 U. Toledo 
L. Rev. 1165, 1167 (1982); Smith, International Regulation of Chemical and Biological 
Weapons: "Yellow Rain" and Arms Control, 1984 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1011, 1048-56; Green 37-38, 
129-31. 
There are different views as to the extent to which the prohibition of use of chemical weapons has 
become part of customary international law . At least four positions may be advanced on this question: 
(1) The 1925 Gas Protocol is not customary international law, and use of chemical 
weapons is not contrary, per se, to internationally accepted customary rules. The 
Protocol is a no-first-use agreement between the contracting parties. 
(2) The prohibition of first use of chemical weapons as embodied in the 1925 Gas 
Protocol and relevant reservations thereto has become part of the customary 
international law and is, therefore, binding on all nations towards all the others, 
whether parties to it or not. This is the position of the United States. 
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27.( ... continued) 
(3) Use of chemical weapons is contrary to customary international law. It is 
pennitted only as a belligerent reprisal. 
(4) Use of chemical weapons is contrary to customary international law in all 
circumstances. 
Since all NATO and Warsaw Pact nations became parties to the 1925 Gas Protocol, there could 
have been no legitimate first-use of chemical weapons in a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation. 
The docttine of reciprocity has also been advanced as a possible basis for the legitimate use of chemical 
weapons. Under art. 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 23 May 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 67? (1969), and in AFP 110-20, at 7-2, and the 
customary intemationallaw of reciprocity, a breach of a multilateral tteaty, that is a violation of a 
provision essential to the accomplishment of the object of the tteaty, can be invoked by the affected 
parties as a ground for suspending the operation of the tteaty in their relations with the violating 
nation or nations. Therefore, all NATO nations, whether they ratified the Geneva Protocol with 
reservations or not, could arguably have invoked the customary rule stated in the Vienna 
Convention, as well as the application of the general principle of reciprocity, to justify a response 
with chemical weapons if attacked with such weapons by a Warsaw Pact country. It could be argued, 
however, that art. 60 of the Vienna Convention does not apply to the 1925 Gas Protocol because, as a 
tteaty of humanitarian character, the Protocol is not amenable to reservation (see art. 60, para. 5). 
As for the limits to this chemical response, a nation which ratified the 1925 Gas Protocol with 
retaliatory use reservation could take the position that, in case of violation of the tteaty, it would 
feel free from any obligation under the terms of the Protocol. It is important to note that, according 
to the letter of the first use reservation: 
- The violation may be committed either against the reserving nation or against one 
of its allies. The reservation affirms the right of the reserving nation to retaliate on 
behalf of its allies. 
- All members of the enemy alliance are equally legitimate objects of retaliation 
whichever the violating nation. 
- Since the violation of the Treaty causes, for the reserving nation, the "suspension" 
of the prohibition altogether, the retaliatory use of chemical weapons does not need 
to be proportionate or comparable to the violation to which it replies. 
The same position could be taken also by a nation which ratified the 1925 Gas Protocol without 
reservations. In fact, if the violation is committed by a nation which has, or whose allies have, a 
retaliatory-use reservation, the nation attacked could invoke the principle of reciprocity. Under the 
principle of reciprocity, a reservation entered by a nation which modifies the provisions of a treaty in 
its relations with other parties, modifies those provisions to the same extent for the other parties in 
their relations with the reserving nation (see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 21). 
On the other hand, if the view on the consolidation of the prohibition of chemical weapons into a 
rule of customary intemationallaw is accepted, then this right of retaliation is no longer applicable 
without limitations. According to this interpretation, since the prohibition of chemical weapons no 
longer stems from the Protocol, but has become a rule of customary international law , the use of such 
weapons by an enemy does not confer on a nation the right to "suspend" the prohibition altogether, 
but only gives the nation the right to act in reprisal against the violating nation, in accordance with 
intemationallaw. As a reprisal, such response must be proportionate to the initial violation. 
As a consequence, and regardless of whether they ratified the 1925 Gas Protocol with reservations 
or not, nations which consider the general prohibition of chemical weapons as being part of 
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gases; analogous liquids; or materials that cause immediate death. Incapacitating 
agents are those producing symptoms that persist for appreciable periods of time 
after exposure to the agent has terminated.28 Consistent with its first-use 
27.( ... continued) 
customary international law, may take the position that they are only allowed to act in reprisal, 
including in-kind reprisal where necessary, if attacked with chemical weapons. It is to be noted that 
the right to use chemical weapons in reprisal does not stem from reservations to the 1925 Gas 
Protocol, but from the law of reprisal itself. For a discussion of reprisal see paragraph 6.2.3 (p. 335). 
28. Lethal and incapacitating agents are chemical agents intended for use in military operations 
to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate personnel through their physiological effects. This 
definition excludes riot control agents (RCAs) , chemical herbicides, and smoke and flame 
materials. Chemical agents are classified according to physical state, use, persistence and 
physiological effects, with the latter two being the most common in military usage. 
Lethal agents are capable of producing incapacitation, serious injury, or death when used in field 
concentrations. Incapacitating agents, on the other hand, produce non-permanent physiological or 
mental effects, or both, rendering individuals incapable of concerted efforts in the performance of 
their assigned duties while normally allowing complete recovery. 
Nerve agents are lethal agents which cause paralysis by interfering with the transmission of nerve 
impulses. They are organophosphorus compounds similar to many commonly used insecticides. 
However, they are several orders of magnitude more toxic, minute quantities of which can kill. 
Basically, the nerve agents work at the nerve/muscle interface by blocking the enzyme which 
allows the muscles to relax. Consequendy, the victim loses muscular control and dies of suffocation 
due to inability to breathe. Death can occur within a few minutes if the dose is large enough. Nerve 
agents are liquids which vaporize into the air or can be disseminated in the form of an aerosoL In 
addition to working through inhalation or ingestion, the liquid and (to a minor extent) the vapors 
can be absorbed through the skin. The eyes are particularly sensitive to nerve agents and very small 
liquid or vapor exposures can cause pinpointing of the pupils (miosis) making it impossible to 
perform tasks requiring good visual acuity. A mask, protective garment, and gloves are required for 
protection, but the garment may be removed as the possibility of liquid contamination declines, 
permitting greater operational efficiency. 
Blood agents are chemical compounds, including the cyanide group, that affect bodily functions by 
preventing the transfer of oxygen from the blood to the body cells causing rapid death. Blood 
agents are highly volatile which enhances their ability to spread rapidly over a target, but requires 
large concentrations of agent and gready limits their duration of effectiveness. Some of the 
compounds deteriorate rapidly in storage. They are also called cyanogen agents. 
Choking agents work by breaking down the interior surface of the lungs causing them to fill up with 
fluids. Death can result from what has been called "dry land drowning." The most commonly 
known choking agent is phosgene, which was used in World War I. Under its chemical name 
(carbonyl chloride) phosgene is an industrial chemical used in the manufacture of plastics, some 
drug products, and urethane foam. This class of agents, effective in trench warfare, would be of 
only very limited utility in modem military operations and is generally considered to be obsolete. 
Blister agents or vesicants are chemical agents which injure the eyes and lungs, and bum or blister the 
skin. Both the liquid and the vapors can have this effect, making whole body protection mandatory 
in a blister agent environment. The most commonly known blister agent is mustard, which was 
widely used in World War I. Blister agents can be lethal if inhaled; however, the more common 
result is incapacitation due to blistering of the skin. Mustard has a delayed effect; it does not cause 
immediate pain, the first symptoms appear in 4-6 hours. Also, it freezes at approximately 58°F. 
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reservation to the 1925 Gas Protocol, the United States maintained a lethal and 
incapacitating chemical weapons capability for deterrence and possible 
retaliatory purposes only. National Command Authorities (NCA) approval was 
required for retaliatory use oflethal or incapacitating chemical weapons by U.S. 
Forces. Retaliatory use of lethal or incapacitating chemical agents was to be 
terminated as soon as the enemy use of such agents that prompted the retaliation 
had ceased and any tactical advantage gained by the enemy through unlawful first 
use had been redressed. Upon coming into force of the 1993 Chemical Weapons 
Convention, any use of chemical weapons by a party to that convention, 
whether or not in retaliation against unlawful first use by another nation, will be 
prohibited. (See paragraph 10.3.1.2). 
28.( ... continued) 
However, mixing mustard with lewisite results in an agent with a lower freezing point which 
produces immediate stinging of the skin. 
Chemical munitions may be classified as unitary or binary. Unitary munitions are filled with the 
premixed complete agent. These can be very simple in design and all consist of a container which 
opens or bursts on or over the target releasing the agent. Binary munitions contain two non-lethal 
substances which mix in route to the target to produce a lethal or incapacitating agent. While they 
offer safety, surety, and logistical advantages over unitary munitions, binary weapons are more 
complex. 
Joint Pub. 1-02 passim; 50 U.S.C. sec. 1521G);Joint Pub. 3-11, Subj:Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, 
Biological, and Chemical Defense; OPNAVINST P-86-1-95, Subj: Chemical, Biological, and 
Radiological Defenses Handbook; FM 3-6, Subj: Field Behaviors of Nuclear, Biological, and 
Chemical Agents. 
For additional background on chemical warfare see St. Aubin & Williams, Soviet Chemical Warfure 
Agents: Another Type of Threat, All Hands, April 1982, at 38-43; Moore, Ratification of the 
Geneva Protocol on Gas and Bacteriological Warfure: A Legal and Political Analysis, 58 Va. L. Rev. 
419 (1972); CBW, Chemical and Biological Warfure (Rose ed. 1968); Thomas & Thomas, Legal 
Limits on the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (1970); Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, The Control of Chemical and Biological Weapons (1971); Geneva Gas 
Protocol 0[1925, Hearing;; Before Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations on Sen. Ex. J, 92d Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1972); 10 Whiteman 454-79; 6 Hackworth 269-71. More recent developments on the use of 
chemical weapons are described in Report of Group of Experts on the Alleged Use of Chemical 
Weapons, U.N. Doc. A/37/259, 1 Dec. 1982 (Iran-Iraq war); Chemical Warfure in Southeast Asia 
and Mghanistan, Report to the Congress by Secretary of State Haig, March 22, 1982, Dep't of State 
Special Report No. 98; Chemical Warfure in Southeast Asia and Mghanistan: An Update, Report 
from Secretary of State Shultz, November 1982, Dep't of State Special Report No. 104, reprinted in 
Dep't St. Bull., Dec. 1982, at 44-53; Reports of the Missions Dispatched by the Secretary General to 
Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Conflict between the Islamic 
Republic ofIran and Iraq, U.N. Docs. S/16433, 26 Mar. 1984; S/17911, 12 Mar. 1986; S/18852, 13 
May 1987; S/19823, 25 Apr. 1988; S/20060, 20 July 1988; S/20063, 25 July 1988 (generally 
confirming the use by Iraq of mustard gas in the Iran-Iraq war); Cordesman, Creating Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, Armed Forces J. Int'l, Feb. 1989, at 54 (recounting development and use of 
chemical weapons by Iran and Iraq); Spiers, Chemical and Biological Weapons, A Study of 
Proliferation (1994). 
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10.3.1.2 The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention.29 This comprehensive 
Convention will, upon entry into force,30 prohibit the development, 
production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, and mandate the 
destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities for 
all nations that are party to it.31 The Convention specifically prohibits the use of 
29. See paragraph 10.3.1, note 22 (p. 467). 
30. The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention came into force on 29 April 1997. 
31. Art. I of the Convention, entitled "General Obligations," provides that: 
1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances: 
(a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical 
weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone; 
(b) To use chemical weapons; 
(c) To engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; 
(d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any 
activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention. 
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy chemical weapons it owns or possesses, 
or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with 
the provisions of this Convention. 
3. Each State Party undertakes to destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the 
territory of another State Party, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention. 
4. Each State Party undertakes to destroy any chemical weapons production 
facilities it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction 
or control, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention. 
5. Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method ofwarfure. 
The Convention's Annex on Implementation and Verification (referred to in the Convention as 
the "Verification Annex") establishes detailed verification procedures providing for on-site 
inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments of all locations at which chemical weapons are 
stored or destroyed and of all chemical weapons production facilities. 
Destruction of chemical weapons, except for "old chemical weapons" and "abandoned chemical 
weapons," must begin within two years after the Convention enters into force for the party that 
possesses them and must be completed not later than ten years after the Convention comes into 
forces (Art. IV, para. 6). If a party to the Convention is unable to destroy its chemical weapons 
within that ten year period, the deadline may be extended, but in no circumstances beyond fifteen 
years after the Convention enters into force (Verification Annex, Part IV (A), para. 26). "Old 
chemical weapons" are defined as those produced before 1925, or those produced between 1925 
and 1946 that have deteriorated to the extent that they can no longer be used as chemical weapons 
(Art. II, para. 5). "Abandoned chemical weapons" are chemical weapons, including "old chemical 
weapons," abandoned by one nation after 1924 on the territory of another nation \vithout the 
consent of the latter (Art. II, para. 5). "Old chemical weapons" are to be disposed of or destroyed as 
"toxic waste" (Verification Annex, Part IV (B), para. 7). Under the regime for destruction of 
"abandoned chemical weapons," the abandoning nation, upon conclusion of a mutually agreeable 
program with the nation in whose territory the weapons are located, is responsible for the 
destruction (Verification Annex, Part IV (B), paras. 8-18). 
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riot control agents as a "method of warfare. ,,32 It does not, however, modifY 
existing international law with respect to herbicidal agents.33 
The United States signed the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention on 13 
January 1993. The President transmitted the Convention to the Senate on 23 
November 1993 for its advice and consent to ratification.34 
10.3.2 Riot Control Agents. Riot control agents are those gases, liquids and 
analogous substances that are widely used by governments for civil law 
enforcement purposes. Riot control agents, in all but the most unusual 
circumstances, cause merely transient effects that disappear within minutes after 
exposure to the agent has terminated. Tear gas and Mace are examples of riot 
control agents in widespread use by law enforcement officials. 
10.3.2.1 Riot Control Agents in Armed Conflict. 
10.3.2.1.1 Under the 1925 Gas Protocol. The United States considers that 
use of riot control agents in armed conflict was not prohibited by the 1925 Gas 
Protocol. However, the United States formally renounced first use of riot 
control agents in armed conflict except in defensive military modes to save lives. 
Uses of riot control agents in time of armed conflict which the United States 
considers not to be violative of the 1925 Gas Protocol include: 
1. Riot control situations in areas under effective U.S. military control, to include 
control of rioting prisoners of war. 
2. Situations in which civilians are used to mask or screen attacks and civilian 
casualties can be reduced or avoided. 
3. Rescue missions involving downed aircrews or escaping prisoners or war. 
31.( ... continued) 
Destruction of a party's chemical weapons production facilities must begin within one year after 
the Convention enters into force for that nation and must be completed within ten years after the 
Convention enters into force (Art. V, para. 8), e.g., 29 April 2007. 
For a comprehensive commentary on the Convention see Krutzsch & Trapp, A Commentary on 
the Chemical Weapons Convention (1994). See also the article-by-article analysis of the 
Convention in the State Department Letter of Submittal attached to the President's Letter of 
Transmittal to the Senate of23 November 1993 (see note 34 (p. 473». 
32. See paragraph 10.3.2 (p. 473). 
33. See paragraph 10.3.3 (p. 476). 
34. Chemical Weapons Convention, Letter of Transmittal, Senate Treaty Doc. 103-21; 
reprinted in Dept. of State DISPATCH, Dec. 1993, Vol. 4, No. 49. On 24 April 1997, the Senate 
adopted its Resolution ofRatification, subject to 28 "conditions." The complete text of the Senate 
Resolution is reprinted in Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to 
International Law, Chemical Weapons Convention, 91 Am. J. Int'l L. 499 (1997). 
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4. Protection of military supply depots, military convoys, and other military 
activities in rear echelon areas from civil disturbances, terrorist activities, or 
paramilitary operations. 
Such employment of riot control agents by u.S. forces in armed conflict requires 
35 NCA approval. 
10.3.2.1.2 Under the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. Use of riot 
control agents as a "method of warfare" is prohibited by the 1993 Chemical 
Weapons Convention.36 However, that term is not defined by the Convention. 
The United States considers that this prohibition applies in international as well 
as internal armed conflict37 but that it does not apply in normal peacekeeping 
operations, law enforcement operations, humanitarian and disaster relief 
operations, counter-terrorist and hostage rescue operations, and noncombatant 
rescue operations conducted outside of such conflicts.38 
35. Exec. Order No. 11,850, 40 Fed. Reg. 16187,3AC.F.R. 149-50(1975 );FM27-10,para. 
38; reprinted in AFP 110-20, at 4-69. Presidential memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, 10 
January 1976, Subj: Use of Riot Control Agents to Protect or Recover Nuclear Weapons, adds to 
this list security operations regarding the protection or recovery of nuclear weapons. 
36. Art. I, para. 5 of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention provides that: 
Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare. 
Art. II, para. 7 defines "Riot Control Agents" as: 
Any chemical not listed in a Schedule [of toxic and precursor chemicals] which can 
produce rapidly in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which 
disappear within a short time following termination of exposure. 
Art. II, para. 2 defines "Toxic Chemicals" as: 
Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, 
temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals .... 
37. The meaning of the term "international armed conflict" is well-established in international 
law. It encompasses armed conflict between sovereign States, including the armed occupation of 
one State of the territory of another. The scope of "internal armed conflict" is less well-established. 
Such a conflict generally involves significant fighting between the established government and 
dissident armed groups. An internal armed conflict is generally not considered to include internal 
disturbances and tensions that do not involve relatively protracted and sustained hostilities. Riots 
and isolated and sporadic acts of violence do not constitute internal armed conflict as that term is 
understood in international law. See paragraph 5.1, note 4 (p. 290). 
38. President Clinton's message to the Senate of the United States of23 June 1994. White 
House Press Release, Jun. 23, 1994. That message also states that "according to the current 
international understanding" the use of riot control agents against enemy combatants, or mixed 
groups of enemy combatants and noncombatants, is prohibited even for humanitarian purposes, 
such as the rescue of downed aircrews or in situations where the enemy utilizes noncombatants to 
mask or screen attacks. But see note 39 which sets forth Condition 26 of the Senate's Resolution of 
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The United States also considers that it is pennissible to use riot control agents 
against other than combatants in areas under direct U.S. military control, 
including to control rioting prisoners of war and to protect convoys from civil 
disturbances, terrorists and ~aramilitary organizations in rear areas outside the 
zone of immediate combat. 9 
38.( ... continued) 
Ratification of the Convention. This Condition requires that the President take no action which 
would alter or eliminate Executive Order 11,850. See note 35 (p. 474). See also C]CSI 3100.07A, 
Subj: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense; Riot Control Agents [RCAs]; and Herbicides, 
which provides in Enclosure B, para. 2b that: 
The United States has renounced first use of RCAs in war except in defensive 
military modes to save lives, such as: 
(1) Use of riot control agents in riot control situations in areas under direct and distinct 
United States military control, to include controlling rioting prisoners of war. 
(2) Use of riot control agents in a situation in which civilians are used to mask or 
screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided. 
(3) Use ofRCAs in rescue missions in remotely isolated areas, of downed aircrews 
and passengers, and escaping prisoners. 
(4) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon areas outside the zone of immediate 
combat to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists, and paramilitary 
organizations. 
(5) Security operations regarding the protection or recovery of nuclear weapons. 
Para. 4.a.(1) of Enclosure B provides that only the President may authorize the "Use ofRCAs 
in war, including defensive military modes. However, advance authority to use RCAs in 
wartime for protection or recovery of nuclear weapons has been delegated to the Secretary of 
Defense." 
39. See note 38. See also Senate Resolution of Ratification (paragraph 10.3.1.2, note 34 
(p. 473)), which provides in Condition 26: 
(26) Riot Control Agents.-
(A) Permitted Uses.-Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of 
ratification, the President shall certify to Congress that the United States is not 
restricted by the Convention in its use of riot control agents, including the use 
against combatants who are parties to a conflict, in any of the following cases: 
(i) United States Not a Party.-The conduct of peacetime military operations 
within an area of ongoing armed conflict when the United States is not a party to the 
conflict (such as recent use of the United States Armed Forces in Somalia, Bosnia, 
and Rwanda). 
(ii) Consensual Peacekeeping.-Consensual peacekeeping operations when the 
use of force is authorized by the receiving State, including operations pursuant to 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. 
(iii) Chapter VII Peacekeeping.-Peacekeeping operations when force is authorized by 
the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. 
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10.3.2.2 Riot Control Agents in Time of Peace. Employment of riot 
control agents in peacetime is not proscribed by either the 1925 Gas Protocol or 
the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and may be authorized by the 
Secretary of Defense, or in limited circumstances, by the commanders of the 
combatant commands. Circumstances in which riot control agents may be 
authorized for employment in peacetime include: 
1. Civil disturbances in the United States, its territories and possessions.
40 
2. Protection and security on U.S. bases, posts, embassy grounds, and installations 
. I di fc' I 41 overseas, mc u ng or not contro purposes. 
3. Law enforcement 
a. On-base and off-base in the United States, its territories and possessions; 
b. On-base overseas; 
c. Off-base overseas when specifically authorized by the host government.42 
4. Noncombatant evacuation operations involving U.S. or foreign nationals.
43 
10.3.3 Herbicidal Agents. Herbicidal agents are gases, liquids, and analogous 
substances that are designed to defoliate trees, bushes, or shrubs, or to kill long 
39.{ ... continued) 
(B) Implementation.-The President shall take no measure, and prescribe no rule 
or regulation, which would alter or eliminate Executive Order 11,850 of April 8, 
1975. [See paragraph 10.3.2.1.1, note 35 (p. 473).) 
(C) Definition.-In this paragraph, the term "riot control agent" has the meaning 
given the term in Article II(7) of the Convention. [See note 36 (p. 474).) 
But see Krutzsch & Trapp, paragraph 10.3.1.2, note 31 (p. 472) at 36 & 42-43. On 25 Apri11997, 
President Clinton certified to the Congress acceptance of the 28 Conditions, including Condition 
26 on riot control agents. Congo Rec. 105th Cong., 1st Sess., 28 Apr 1997, at H 1895. 
40. Department of Defense Civil Disturbance Plan, GARDEN PLOT, 15 February 1991; 
DOD Directive 3025.12, Subj: Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances; DOD Directive 
3025.15, Subj: Military Assistance to Civil Authorities; DOD Directive 5525.5, Subj: DOD 
Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials; SECNA VINST 5820.7B, Subj: 
Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials. 
41. The U.S.-controlled portions of foreign installations are considered U.S. installations. 
jSCP Annex F. 
42. DEPSECDEF memo for Service Secretaries and Chainnan,joint ChiefS of Staff, Subj: Use 
of Chemical Irritants in Military Law Enforcement, 19 june 1978. 
43. Authority for use of riot control agents in peacetime situations not covered by the above 
(e.g., to save lives in counterterrorist operations) should be submitted through the chain of 
command for approval pursuant to C]CSI 3100.07A (paragraph 10.3.2.1.2, note 38 (p. 474)). 
Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons 477 
grasses and other vegetation that could shield the movement of enemy forces. 
The United States considers that use of herbicidal agents in wartime is not 
prohibited b~ either the 1925 Gas Protocol44 or the 1993 Chemical Weapons 
Convention 5 but has formally renounced the first use of herbicides in time of 
armed conflict except for control of vegetation within U.S. bases and 
installations or around their immediate defensive perimeters. Use of herbicidal 
agents during armed conflict requires NCA approval.46 Use of herbicidal agents 
in peacetime may be authorized by the Secretary of Defense or, in limited 
circumstances, by commanders of the combatant commands.47 
10.4 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 
International law prohibits all biological weapons or methods of warfare 
whether directed against persons, animals, or plant life.48 Biological weapons 
include microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origin (i.e., 
natural or artificial) or methods of production. 49 
44. See paragraph 10.3.1.1 (p.467). 
45. See paragraph 10.3.1.2 (p. 472). The Preamble to the 1993 Chemical Weapons 
Convention provides: 
The States Parties to this Convention, 
7. Recognizing the prohibition, embodied in the pertinent agreements 
and relevant principles of intemationallaw, of the use of herbicides as a 
method of warfare. 
Have agreed as follows: 
See also Krutzsch & Trapp, paragraph 10.3.1.2, note 31 (p.472) at 8-9. However, Art. II, para. 2 
defines "Toxic Chemicals" prohibited by the Convention in terms of their adverse impact on 
"humans or animals" (see note 36 (p. 474». In their commentary on Art. II, para. 2, 
Krutzsch & Trapp, id., at 30, observe that: 
The definition excludes, on the other hand, toxicity against plants. Herbicides will 
not be regarded as chemical weapons if used with an intent to destroy plants. That 
would even apply if the (secondary) effect of such use were the killing or harming of 
people, for example by toxic side effects or by denial of food supplies. On the other 
hand, herbicides would be covered if they were used in order to direaly kill or hann 
people through their toxicity. 
46. Executive Order No. 11,850 permits such use under regulations applicable to their 
domestic use. See paragraph 10.3.2.1.1, note 35 (p. 474). See also C]CSI 3100.07A (note 38 
(p. 474» at Encl. B. 
47. ]SCP Annex F. 
48. Green 47-48; Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat, in Fleck, at 151-52. Compare Levie, 
paragraph 10.3, note 20 (p. 466) at 342-45. 
49. Biological weapons are items or materiel which project, disperse, or disseminate biological 
agents, including arthropod vectors. They are inherendy indiscriminate and uncontrollable and are 
(continued ... ) 
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10.4.1 Treaty Obligations. The 1925 Gas Protocol prohibits the use in armed 
conflict of biological weapons.50 The 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (the "1972 Biological Weapons 
Convention") prohibits the production, testing, and stockpiling of biological 
weapons. 51 The Convention obligates nations that are a party thereto not to 
develop, produce, stockpile, or acquire biological agents or toxins" of types and 
in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or other 
peaceful purposes," as well as "weapons, equipment or means of delivery 
designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict." 
All such materials were to be destroyed by 26 December 1975. The United 
States, Russia, and most other NATO and former Warsaw Pact nations are 
parties to both the 1925 Gas Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons 
Convention. 
10.4.2 United States Policy Regarding Biological Weapons. The United 
States considers the prohibition against the use of biological weapons during 
armed conflict to be part of customary intemationallaw and thereby binding on 
all nations whether or not they are parties to the 1925 Gas Protocol or the 1972 
49.( ... continued) 
universally condemned. Biological warfare/biological operations is the employment of biological 
agents to produce casualties in man or animals and to damage plants or materiel. Biological operations 
also include defense against such employment. 
Any microorganism able to cause disease in man, animals, or plants, or cause the deterioration of 
materiel, is capable of being used as a biological agent. However, due to difficulty in production, 
storage and dissemination, and to limited effectiveness, a large number of diseases would have litde 
or no military utility. Even those capable of producing significant results would have a delayed 
effect due to the incubation period, and the results would be dependent on a variety of factors 
including weather, target characteristics, and countermeasures. Due to their delayed effectiveness, 
biological agents do not lend themselves to tactical, but rather to strategic employment to achieve a 
long-term decrease in an enemy's warmaking capability. Biological agents also lend themselves to 
clandestine delivery. 
Biological toxins are the toxic chemical by-products of biological organisms. They can be 
synthesized chemically and share many of the characteristics of chemical agents; however, they are 
considered to be biologicals under the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. Toxins have 
advantages over organisms in storage, delivery, and onset of effects. Some toxins are much more 
toxic than the most powerful nerve agents. 
Joint Pub. 1-02 passim. See also Rose, The Coming Explosion of Silent Weapons, Nav . War Coli. 
Rev., Summer 1989, at 6-29. 
50. The United States has accepted this obligation without reservation. Compare the U.S. first 
use reservation on chemical weapons under the 1925 Gas Protocol, paragraph 10.3.1.1, note 24 
(p.467). 
51. Washington, London & Moscow, 10 April 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583; T.I.A.S. 8062; 1015 
U.N.T.S. 163; reprinted in AFP 110-20, at 4-71. There were 139 parties to the 1972 Biological 
Weapons Convention as ofl January 1997. Arms Control ReporterJanuary 1997, at 701.AA. 
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Biological Weapons Convention. 52 The United States has, therefore, fonnally 
renounced the use of biological weapons under any circumstance. 53 Pursuant to 
its treaty obligations, the United States has destroyed all its biological and toxin 
weapons and restricts its research activities to development of defensive 
capabilities. 54 
52. AFP 11 0-31, para. 6-4b, at 6-4 and sources cited at paragraph 10.3.1.1, note 27 (p.468). 
53. 5 Weekly Compo Pres. Doc. 1659-61 (25 Nov. 1969); Dep't St. Bull. 226-27 (1970). 
54. 11 Weekly Compo Pres. Doc. 73-74 (White House Press Release, Jan. 22,1975); 1976 
Digest ofU .S. Practice in International Law 732-36. U.S. research activities are devoted primarily 
to the development of vaccines. 
